For instructing solicitors, following the Supreme Court judgment of 2 July 2025

In short

Does the sharing principle apply to non-matrimonial property?

No. In Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, the Supreme Court held that the sharing principle applies only to matrimonial property, departing from the approach in Charman v Charman (No 4). Non-matrimonial property remains available to meet needs and to answer a compensation claim, but it is not subject to sharing. Non-matrimonial property becomes matrimonial only where the parties, over time, have treated the asset as shared. A transfer between spouses for tax planning purposes does not, without more, achieve that.

About the author David Marusza

David Marusza

Barrister, Harcourt Chambers

Called 2009. Recognised in The Legal 500 UK Bar 2026.

David practises in all aspects of private family law, with particular focus on the financial aspects of divorce and relationship breakdown. He has substantial experience of acting for high net worth clients in financial remedy proceedings involving assets in excess of £15 million, family companies, inherited assets and an international element, and he also undertakes TOLATA work and claims under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989. He has a particular interest in nuptial agreements, on which he writes for the Practical Law Company, and is frequently instructed in court-based and private FDRs; he is also available to sit as a private FDR judge. He is a member of Lincoln’s Inn and of the Family Law Bar Association and the Association of Lawyers for Children. He read English at the University of e. He has appeared on appeal from all levels of the Family Court and as a junior in the Supreme Court in the matter of A (Children) [2013] UKSC 60.

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For almost twenty years, appellate authority on the treatment of pre-marital and inherited wealth has pulled in more than one direction. Standish has settled the central question and reframed the rest. This guide sets out what the Supreme Court decided, what it deliberately left open, and how the other recent decisions on valuation, conduct, costs and agreements now sit alongside it.

This guide covers financial remedy proceedings in England and Wales.

What the Supreme Court Decided

Mr Standish transferred investments worth around £80 million into his wife’s sole name in 2017 as part of an inheritance tax planning strategy, with the intention that she would settle them into trusts for the children. She did not. The parties separated in 2020.

At first instance, Moor J held that the transfer had matrimonialised the assets, and awarded the wife £45 million on a 60/40 division reflecting their source. The Court of Appeal held that only 25 per cent of the 2017 assets were matrimonial, reducing the award to £25 million.

On the second appeal, he Supreme Court dismissed the wife’s appeal and upheld the £25 million figure. Lord Burrows and Lord Stephens gave a unanimous judgment, with Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lady Simler agreeing.

The Principles to Take From It

  • There is a conceptual distinction between matrimonial property, being the fruits of the marriage partnership, and non-matrimonial property, being property owned before the marriage or received by gift or inheritance from an external source.
  • The sharing principle applies to matrimonial property only. The Court said in terms that the time had come to make clear that non-matrimonial property should not be subject to sharing, departing from Charman v Charman (No 4).
  • Non-matrimonial property remains relevant to needs and to compensation. It is excluded from sharing, not from the case.
  • Matrimonialisation is a valid concept. The Court expressly disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s formulation that it should be applied narrowly, holding that it is neither narrow nor wide.
  • The question is how the parties have dealt with the asset, and whether that shows they have treated it as shared. Over time means long enough for that treatment to be regarded as settled.
  • The three situations identified by Wilson LJ in K v L are not exclusive categories.
  • A transfer into the other party’s sole name, made for tax planning purposes, does not, without more, indicate an intention to share.

What Standish Does Not Decide

The interplay between non-matrimonial property and the needs and compensation principles is left where it was. In the vast majority of cases, needs will absorb the resources  entirely, and the distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property will be decisive only where the assets exceed needs.

Nor does the judgment supply a test that can be applied mechanically. The question of whether parties have treated an asset as shared over a sufficiently settled period is fact-sensitive, and practitioners should expect the argument to move from classification to evidence about how the parties actually conducted their financial affairs.

That has a practical consequence at the disclosure stage. Where source is in issue, the material that matters is the record of how the asset was dealt with during the marriage, not simply how it was held.

How to Approach It in Practice

Situation Approach
Pre-marital or inherited wealth, assets exceed needs Classification is now decisive. Build the evidence on how the asset was dealt with over the marriage, not on title
Pre-marital wealth, needs case The distinction will usually make little difference. Non-matrimonial property remains available to meet needs
Transfer between spouses for tax planning Not matrimonialisation without more. Document the purpose at the time, not after the event; consider a post-nuptial agreement?
Asset mixed with matrimonial property over many years The K v L situations remain useful but are not exhaustive. The test is settled: treatment as shared is key
Advising on wealth protection before or during a marriage Conduct during the marriage now matters as much as the nuptial agreement. Advise on both

The Other Decisions That Still Matter

On business valuations, the summary of Peel J in HO v TL [2023] EWHC 215 (Fam) at paragraphs 21 to 27 remains the practitioner’s starting point. The court determines value, not the expert; valuations of private companies are fragile; and the court’s choices are to fix a value, order a sale, or divide in specie by Wells sharing. The distinction between an accountancy discount and a court discount for illiquidity and risk is set out there and is regularly cited.

On conduct, N v J [2024] EWFC 184 confirms that the high bar to conduct claims is undisturbed by the increased focus on domestic abuse. Peel J held that financial consequence is in practice a necessary ingredient, that the conduct must be material to the outcome, and that any inquiry must be proportionate. The dicta in OG v AG and Tsvetkov v Khayrova remain sound, and allegations of conduct should be case managed robustly at the earliest opportunity.

On costs, HO v TL (Costs) [2024] EWFC 216 restates the starting point that each party bears their own costs, subject to departure under FPR 28.3(6) and the factors in 28.3(7), and emphasises the duty in paragraph 4.4 of PD28A to negotiate reasonably and responsibly. Mainwaring v Bailey [2024] EWHC 2614 (Fam) confirms that litigants in person are held to the procedural rules in the same way as represented parties.

On funding, Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2024] EWCA Civ 84 is a useful example of a legal services payment order covering appeal costs, with Rubin v Rubin still governing.

On overseas divorce, Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3 removed the knock-out blow requirement for setting aside leave under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, and confirmed that the test for leave is whether the claim is substantial or solid, meaning a real prospect of success.

On non-court dispute resolution, NA v LA [2024] EWFC 113 remains a strong steer, with the court staying proceedings under FPR 3.4 in what it described as a paradigm case. GH v GH [2024] EWHC 2547 (Fam) confirms that every case must be referred to an FDR unless there are exceptional reasons, and that it is very hard to envisage a case where an FDR should be dispensed with.

On agreements, AH v BH [2024] EWFC 125 shows the section 25 discretion operating alongside a valid pre-nuptial agreement rather than being displaced by it, while HJB v WPB [2024] EWFC 187 treats a properly negotiated separation agreement as presumptively dispositive, narrowing the court’s inquiry. Read together after Standish, they underline that both the agreement and the parties’ subsequent conduct will be scrutinised.

In Practice: Advising Before the Marriage

Standish has both confirmed and refined practitioners’ understanding of why and in what circumstances assets will be subject to sharing or needs.

In cases of significant prematrimonial or non-matrimonial wealth, the following considerations will be important:

  • Standish has confirmed that legal title is not determinative of whether an asset is matrimonial or non-matrimonial. “Treatment” is therefore going to be crucial; transfer of capital assets for tax efficiency will not be definitive of the question of whether an asset is to be treated as matrimonial or not “without compelling evidence”.
  • In terms of evidence generally, if one party is arguing an asset is non/matrimonial, paper trails are going to be of significant evidence value. This may be particularly important in cases involving valuable chattels or art.
  • Standish is clear that non-matrimonial assets are not simply ring-fenced; they will not be subject to “sharing” claims but will be subject to well-founded needs claims.
  • Prenuptial agreements may be highly useful in such situations in protecting pre-matrimonial wealth as they are able to set out clearly what the parties agree is to be treated as shared property at the start of a marriage and what the parties intend to be excluded from sharing (and, to an extent, needs) are enforceable subject to being fair and certain vitiating factors.
  • If the status of post-marital asset is likely to become contentious, spouses may wish to consider post-nuptial agreements.
  • Care will be needed to ensure non-matrimonial resources are not mixed or mingled, otherwise they may be held to have been treated as shared and therefore matrimonialised.
  • Standish demonstrates that uncertainty over the status of an asset may dramatically influence the overall Court award. Specialist advice on the subject at an early stage is therefore to be advised.

Instruct David Marusza

To discuss a financial remedy matter involving pre-marital or inherited wealth, business assets, a nuptial agreement or an international element, or to book a private FDR, contact the clerks at Harcourt Chambers.

Contact: 020 7353 6961 │ clerks@harcourtchambers.co.uk

Frequently Asked Questions

That the sharing principle applies only to matrimonial property, and that non-matrimonial property becomes matrimonial only where the parties have, over time, treated the asset as shared. The Supreme Court dismissed the wife’s appeal and upheld an award of £25 million.

The process by which non-matrimonial property becomes matrimonial property and so subject to sharing. Following Standish, it rests on how the parties have dealt with the asset and whether that shows they treated it as shared over a sufficiently settled period. It is neither a narrow nor a wide concept.

They are excluded from the sharing principle, but not from the case. Non-matrimonial property remains available to meet needs and to answer a compensation claim, so the distinction is only decisive where the assets exceed needs.

Not without more. Standish holds that a transfer for tax planning purposes does not by itself indicate an intention to share, and title is not the determinative factor.

The bar remains high. In N v J [2024] EWFC 184, Peel J held that the increased focus on domestic abuse does not lower the bar;  financial consequence is in practice necessary, and the conduct must be material to the outcome.

Only for exceptional reasons. In GH v GH [2024] EWHC 2547 (Fam), Peel J held that FDRs are a key part of the process and that it is very hard to envisage a situation where one should be dispensed with.

This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. The law is correct as at the date of publication. Specific advice should always take individual circumstances into account.

Sources

  • Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, judgment of 2 July 2025 – Supreme Court
  • Standish v Standish [2024] EWCA Civ 567 – Find Case Law
  • Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25 – legislation.gov.uk
  • Potanin v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3 – Find Case Law
  • HO v TL [2023] EWHC 215 (Fam) and HO v TL (Costs) [2024] EWFC 216 – Find Case Law
  • N v J [2024] EWFC 184; AH v BH [2024] EWFC 125; HJB v WPB [2024] EWFC 187; NA v LA [2024] EWFC 113 – Find Case Law
  • Mainwaring v Bailey [2024] EWHC 2614 (Fam); GH v GH [2024] EWHC 2547 (Fam); Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2024] EWCA Civ 84 – Find Case Law
  • Family Procedure Rules, Part 3, Part 9 and rRule28.3, and Practice Direction 28A – justice.gov.uk
Related areas Family Finance & Financial RemedyFinancial Remedy AppealsFinancial RemedyFinancial Provision for Children & Child SupportCourt of Protection: Finances & Property

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